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Miscreation
Richard Shiff
Introduction

Part I

Many modern critics of art have regarded criticism as
an art in itself. The critical account has its origin in the
work of art but strikes out on its own , perhaps to
extend the artistic world formed by the object of its
scrutiny or even dialectically to confront that world
and re-form it into yet another creation . In such critical
practice, strict evaluation of new artistic constructs ,
in terms of old or traditional norms , may in itself be
considered bad form; judgment of this kind binds
human creativity to a fixed center by a chain of
finite length , and the circle of creative activity cannot
expand. Yet, as I will ultimately argue in this essay,
the critic's first responsibility is to his own fixed
principles , not the rude innovations of an unfamiliar
art. Criticism has good reason to maintain its critical
distance from art and to challenge malformed
creations , miscreations, wherever they appear.
The notion of miscreation readily calls forth visual
images. We may think of grotesque mutations, combinations of unrelated species or improperly formed
beings with the wrong placement or number of limbs.
We may even conjure up a familiar object, distorted
with regard to its internal proportional relationshipsa chair with legs of four different lengths. Such images
challenge conventional definitions and are inherently
both frightening and comical ; our specific emotional
response will depend upon the context in which we
encounter these bizarre constructions that confuse
our rational order.
Images that may threaten are often transformed into
ones that provide humor through the art of caricature.
The foreign warmonger looks funny and harmless in
the political cartoon. Alternatively, caricature may
exaggerate a form so that its largely hidden impropriety stands revealed. Caricature both employs and
exposes miscreation . Thus , in order to investigate
the relation of a modern critic to a work of artan adversary relationship where creation may appear
as miscreation- we shall study examples of caricature
as well as art which lends itself to caricature. But
first we must understand what makes the modern
critic specifically " modern "; we must consider his
tendency to subject his evaluation of creativity to a
judgment of originality. When originality is at stake ,
questions of creation become especially difficult.

"To create something means to make it non-technically,
but yet consciously and voluntarily. " Such was R. G.
Collingwood 's definition of artistic creation made in
1938. In his concern to distinguish artistic activity
from technical procedure, or, more simply, to distinguish art from craft, Collingwood was typical of his
time , and even of our time. He argued that, although
human creation was distinct from divine creation , it
was yet a pure bringing into being, not a mere transformation of preexisting material. Works of art,
Collingwood writes,
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are not made as means to an end; they are not
made according to any preconceived plan; and they are
not made by imposing a new form upon a given matter.
Yet they are made deliberately and responsibly, by
people who know what they are doing , even though they
do not know in advance what is going to come of it.
The creation which theologians ascribe to God is
peculiar in one way and on ly one. [The peculiarity]
is that in the case of his act there lacks not on ly a
prerequisite in the shape of a matter to be transformed ,
but any prerequisite of any kind whatsoever [In contrast,] in order that a work of art shou ld be created ,
the prospective artist. .. must have in him certain unexpressed emotions , and must also have the wherewithal
to express them ..
The artistic experience is not generated out of
nothing. [1938: 128 - 130 , 273] 1

Still, for Collingwood, works of human art may be
"original ," like God 's creations, despite their contingency and the need for an artistic medium or language. He writes that
Every genuine [artistic] expression must be an original
one .... The artistic activity does not " use" a " ready-made
language", it "creates" language as it goes along.
[1938:275]2

Collingwood takes pains to argue that artistic expression is not restricted by preexisting expressive patterns .
In effect, he seeks to deny any fully determining role
to the world of discourse and technical procedure in
which the artist is situated, although this situation
is surely a major aspect of what he calls the "circumstances" that facilitate creation , circumstances to
which God is not held . Collingwood is cognizant of
the importance of the medium when he writes that
"there is no way of expressing the same feeling in
two different media" and that a conscious (or imaginative) "idea is had as an idea only in so far as it
is expressed [in a medium]." But the defining force
of the medium itself seems to dissipate as Collingwood approaches the logical extreme of his own
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position- "every word [i.e. , every objectified artistic
expression] as it actually occurs in discourse, occurs
once and once only" (1938:245 , 249, 256). 3
Artistic language does not await its use in repetition ;
man "creates" language as he "goes along. " Every
expression is original.
For Collingwood , then , artistic translation must
always be problematic. In the broader view, what
can be expressed in French cannot be conveyed in
English ; in the finer aspect, what can be said with one
word at one time cannot be said with another, or even
with the same, at another time. To use the same words
self-consciously to mean the same thing a second
time, is , for Collingwood, to deny expression and to
convert art to cliche (1 938 :245 , 275- 276). In a recent
publication , Northrop Frye points similarly to the degree
of " re-creative " translation in any proper appreciation
of another's artistic expression , or indeed in any
appreciation of God 's creation (1980: 64 ff). Human
creation, for both Collingwood and Frye, thus cannot
be confined to imitative representation but involves
an original expression (Collingwood) or an original
re-creation (Frye). Curiously, the accounts of both
Collingwood and Frye indicate that mere representation , if it were desired , would be no simple matter.
Representation would fail because of the impossibility
of any perfected translation . Something, if only the
intangible sincerity of expression of which Collingwood
speaks, would be altered. Hence, even mere representations , in differing from their "originals," would be
unique and original to some degree, however accidental
this originality might seem. Do Collingwood and Frye
(along with many others) confer privilege on genuine
artistic creation by ascribing to it an originality that is
consciously generated? 4 The unique aspect of any
human creation might result equally well from the
inevitable failure of language or mediated communication as from a heroic struggle to gain knowledge of
one's self and others.
Although he remains undaunted , Collingwood does
not speak to this issue with his customary certitude.
He admits , in fact he willingly asserts, that
community of language is not [prior to its use]. One does
not first acquire a language and then use it. To possess
it and to use it are the same. We only come to possess it
by repeatedly and progressively attempting to use it.
The reader may object that if what is here maintained
were true there could never be any absolute assurance,
either for the hearer or the speaker, that the one had
understood the other. That is so ; but in fact there is no
such assurance. The only assurance we possess is an
empirical and relative assurance, becoming progressively
stronger as conversation proceeds, and based on the fact
that neither party seems to the other to be talking nonsense. The question whether they understand each other
solvitur interloquendo [is settled in the talking]. If they

understand each other well enough to go on talking , they
understand each other as well as they need ; and there
is no better kind of understanding which they can regret
not having attained . [1938:250 - 251 ; cf. 309 ]

But, we might argue , there is, indeed, a better kind
of understanding -a silence , an end to the talking.
Continuing communication , continuing attempts at
communication , may indicate a continuing doubt or
misunderstanding . Conversation remains subject to
the refractions of mediation or translation ; only silence
is unmediated. Does silence, not conversation, indicate
agreement? Or is it merely lack of communication?
Collingwood does not explore this problem , for he
associates human language and human creation with
a life of change and growth , a continuing creation
(like Frye's process of re-creation) , which is not limited
by time , but defines it. Only silence escapes time and
the question of origin ; true silence, unlike a mere pause
in conversation , is immeasurably repetitious , lacking
even the differentiation of temporal displacement. An
end to the talking , to the linguistic exchange, would
signify an end to Collingwood 's emotional expression ,
or, alternatively, the final convergence and identity of
Frye's re-creation with its antecedent (and ultimately
divine) creation. Continuous silence would signify either
a stasis of death or of an eternal life , but not the
changing , transient human condition we know. 5
Collingwood 's sense of originality involves much
more than the uniqueness of displacement, difference ,
or alterity.6 It establishes a primacy and a subsequent
hierarchical process of communication in which conscious meaningful expression is privileged . Technical
procedures evident in acts of human creativity are
subordinated to the demanding presence of emotional
experience , the living origin. The meaning of a work
of ~rt comes into being by means of an artistic language
wh1ch_1s somehow guided by human will to embody
meanmg. Although artistic meaning does not exist
pnor to artistic creation , it seems the essential core
toward which any conscious act of will is directed .
Hence , exchanges of meaning , conversations , have
for Collingwood more than arbitrary or accidental significance; genuine discovery, communication , and
sharing of meaning occur. For post-Structuralist critics ,
such as Jacques Derrida , this hierarchical relationship
m1ght call for "deconstruction " (1977 , esp . 195).
One .'"r:ight wish to investigate the hidden consequences
of pnv_1legmg originality and unique, even "discovered ,"
meanmg as essential qualities of artistic creation .
Collingwood must indeed admit that human creation
unlike divine creation, involves some technical pro'
cedure , a specific process of making that may be
know~ to many. In general, human creative activity is
conc_e1ved _a~ mediated, having an internal logic and
runn1ng a fm1te cou rse through time - such are its
"circumstances. " 7 An example of a "creative" activity
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Collingwood would not consider art serves to dem onstrate the importance of our awareness of thi s mediation , despite its secondary role in Collingwood 's system .
When a magician waves his arm and a rabbit appears,
the adults in the audience assume some special
technique has been employed ; the rabbit is not created
immediately and out of nothing , but as a result of a
process which may have escaped the notice of both
adults and children . One assumes that the magician
knows full well that the rabbit will appear. Because the
magician has preconceived the end of his "art," his
activity is not art in Collingwood 's terms , but craft. Yet ,
without an allowance for the technical procedure that
was not observed, one would have to admit to having
witnessed some genuine transcendent "art" rather
than the performance of an ultimately material skill or
"craft." This mere magic , denigrated by Collingwood ,
would become a truly magical art. The rabbit would
become an unforeseen and original expression , the
expression of a most powerful being who can bring
forth not only living language , but life itself. Humans,
however, should not create , or even procreate , rabbits.
We may laugh at the miscreation of the magic act
because we know it results from mere clever craft. But
would the comical act of miscreation evoke fright,
rather, if its magic were perceived as " real?" How
extreme a case of creation -extreme in its independence from craft - can we tolerate?
Despite our need to assume the mediation of technical procedure in the case of the magician 's creation,
modern critics have freely associated artistic creativity
with genius and originality; these qualities, like magical
. appearances of the most mysterious sort, seem disjunctive and independent of any known generative or
mediating process. In the case of art, in other words ,
we willingly expose ourselves to potential miscreation
of the sort we refuse to acknowledge in magic. We may
grant that Collingwood 's sense of artistic language
seems to allow for both mediation and originality, so
that art can maintain a footing in both rational expression
and free discovery-this is the appeal of Collingwood 's
theory. Still , such an open concept of artistic means
1 precludes certain kinds of judgments, or at least
makes them impractical . Given the innovative nature
of artistic language itself, we are led to establish fixed
categories , corresponding to modes of activity, in order
to contain that language in its proper place. As a result,
we cannot judge magicians as we would artists , simply
regarding the consequences of their immediate actions
without necessarily applying a standard of craft. We
seem to expect a standardization in magicians' acts
that we do not expect from "artists'." One act of creating
a rabbit is regarded like any other, but one act of painting is not like the others before it nor the others to come .
If we do not expect paintings to be alike, how then can
we know who is a true artist? Is anyone who makes
1

any painting an artist? Do we judge simply by distinguishing the medium employed , the means of
creation? If so , one conclusion is indeed simple: those
who produce rabbits are practicin g magic , while those
who produce paintings are practicing art.
Paintings, as works of art, are original; yet each may
result from the same general creative technique. The
procedures of artistic creation are shared like the
magician 's tricks , while the distinguishing artistic
originality, supposedly lacking in magic acts, seems to
arise "out of nothing. " Despite the fact that we frequently use the terms "original " and "creative " as near
equals in everyday speech , they have the potential to
diverge , just as "art" differentiates itself from repetitive
magical performance. Creativity seems more naturally
linked to technical procedure than does originality.
Magic acts do not have to be original to be good.
In general , judgments of creative technique seem
capable of standing on a more rational foundation than
do judgments of originality. According to the shared
conventions of the medium , one can investigate
whether a work has been made properly, efficiently, or
elegantly. The judgment of originality, in contrast, is
bound to the living person of the artist as a source of
expression ; the sincerely searching failure may thus
appear more praiseworthy than the facile technical
success. When the critic considers originality of primary importance in the act of creation , defining creation (as Collingwood does , for example) in terms of
originality, judgments of creativity cannot depend upon
an evaluation of technical excellence. Good magic may
result from a good hand , but such skillful manipulation
will not guarantee good art. Whenever creativity is
associated with originality, the factor of rational making
becomes secondary. The value of craftsmanship is
cast into doubt, and questions of technique become
confused . Miscreations arise from this critical chaos.

1

1

Part II
" Miscreation " is a word rarely used today ; it is an
evasive term , yet part of the family of the more familiar
"creation. " Its difficulty does not lie in the prefix " mis-"
that calls our attention to deviance . We all make mistakes , misinterpret, and even misbehave. We are often
misinformed , suffer mishaps, and at times may feel
misanthropic. Few of us, however, are likely to be called
" miscreant," a strongly pejorative term that bears upon
" miscreation " when we consider the practice of
criticism .
Possibly, " miscreant" and " miscreation " share a
remote linguistic origin. The rare words "creant" and
"miscreance" have a double existence, deriving in their
first sense (believing/misbelief) from the Latin credere,
and in their second (creating/misgrowth, misshaping ,
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miscreation) from the Latin creare. Whether or not
the two forms of " miscreance" relate to a single distant
source , " miscreant" and " m iscreation " seem to converge semantically in some sense of education or
development, entailing both be lief (or principle) and
growth. I wish to arg ue that the judgment of .an act .
of creation/miscreation , when associated w1th onglnality, does, indeed , bear strongly upon , and can be
correlated with, a judgment of the belief (or heresy) of
the creator. A modern sense of creation , in other
words , with its focus upon originality, brings issues of
belief and social value into question. Furthermore, I will
argue that the evaluating judge or critic must play
a negative ro le, revealing fraud but never (save by
indirection) "creative gen ius. " Final ly, I will relate miscreation to the interpretive strategies of the critic and
art historian.

Figure 1

Sidney Harris. Cartoon for American Scientist,
reprinted in Time, CXIII, 8 (Feb. 19, 1979): 75.

Part Ill
As I have noted , caricature both employs and exposes
miscreation. In addition, caricature plays upon our
sense of conventional wisdom or shared , received
opinion ; it reveals the gap between what is readily
accepted and what challenges belief. So we begin our
study of images of creation and created images with
two humorous drawings that comment on works of
"creative genius," that is, works which might claim
both creative (technical) excellence and originality.
These drawings are potentially destructive of the
dignity of their subjects. Both suggest the relationship
between creation and miscreation. The first deals with
Albert Einstein and the realm of science, and the
second with Edouard Manet and the realm of art. We
leave open for the moment the question of whether
scientific and artistic creativity are generally evaluated
in the same manner.
Sidney Harris economically represents Einstein with
the familiar pipe and baggy clothing and the distinctive
amorphous tussled hair-the product of " neglect," as
Einstein himself put it (Figure 1). Harris renders
Einstein's personal eccentricity distinctly; he is not the
neatly groomed Niels Bohr, another "genius," but one
who never attracted the same public attention to his
physical presence . Einstein 's environment seems as
disorderly as does his person : papers are scattered
about. There is surely no great sense of authority here,
yet we recognize the figure 's special identity, in
particular because of the immanent presence of the
formula E=mc 2 . The correlation of energy with mass
by means of the factor of "the speed of light" has
generated useful physical models as well as powerful
imaginative fictions. Yet Einstein , the author of the equation that inspired both scientists and artists, remains
undignified , his activity in a certain disorder, or rather
in an improper order. His mathematical , theoretical
speculation seems as given to chance (" neglect") as is
his physical appearance . He works systematically, but
his system is one of nonsense. He tries out E=ma 2 ; it
doesn 't go . E=mb 2 is no better. Lucky Einstein, we
laugh , he got it on the third try; if the symbol for the
speed of light had been as anonymous and antepenultimate as "x," he would have been up late into the night.
Einstein's accomplishment, the creation of the formula
E=mc 2 , is here shown to be a product of chance, and
hence created, as it were, out of nothing, through
no consciously meaningful procedure. Whether this
amounts to an admirable act of genius or perspicacity, as opposed to a mere lucky break, will depend
upon the viewer's ultimate identification of Einstein as
"one of them " or "one of us ." Is he one of an alien
class of distinct geniuses? Or is all apparent genius
contingent upon chance occurrence , so that some
day we might all have our own moments of great
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discovery? In either case , genius , in popular com mentary, is depicted as disjunctive , independe nt of
rational procedure . As Roland Barthes has pointed
out, direct "photographs of Einstein show him standing
next to a blackboard covered with mathematical
signs of obvious complexity ; but cartoons of Einstein
(the sign that he has become a legend) show him chalk
still in hand , and having just written on an empty
blackboard , as if without preparation , the magic formula of the world " ( 1972 :69) .8 Einstein is well known
to have denied a role to chance , both in the physical
universe and in his own c reative process (Wertheimer
1959 :69) . Yet the evidence of cartoon and caricature
indicates that in the popular mind his scientific creations appeared as works of art, as original as could
be , discovered like (in Barthes' words) "a basic element, a principia! substance ," independent of any
complex , rational generative procedure .
If the Harris caricature makes Einstein seem more
like one of us , subject to our own chance discoveries ,
his personal achievement is thus belittled. Still ,
Einstein 's theory of relativity is seen very much as his
own creation ; we wonder whether this scientific "fact "
could have been observed by another mind . It seems
as if Einstein has - in god-like fashion and , paradoxically, perhaps in spite of himself-created something
out of nothing . Although college freshmen can be
taught to perform Einstein 's mathematical proof, the
essence of the creative act does not seem to lie in
this acquired mathematical skil l. As Polanyi and Prosch
notes , " Once a scientist has made a discovery or an
engineer has produced a new mechanism , the possession of these things by others requires little effort of the
imagination " (1978 :85). Perhaps there was , indeed ,
some luck involved in the difficult original discovery ;
perhaps Einstein was , at that moment, as confused
or as astounded as his caricaturists might imply.
Einstein 's creation may appear threateningly foreign
to his audience ; and in caricature , it might even
frighten the scientist himself. The popularized version
of the Frankenstein story reveals that when chance is
introduced into scientific procedure , the result can be
monstrous , an obvious case of miscreation. Although
not a living monster, E=mc 2 may yet be a very
imposing figure, not only because of its ultimate incomprehensibility, its disconnection from simpler common
knowledge , but because it is formed from the "foreign "
symbolic language of higher mathematics . Significantly, the caricaturist chooses to identify Einstein
with this seemingly opaque language , still further
removed from our everyday reality than is the strangely
awkward man himself. The special language facilitates
the scientist's thought, yet will seem to deflect our own
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attempts at penetration. And so it is the language itself,
the scientist's means of expression and discovery, that
may suffer at the interpretive hands of the trivializing
caricaturist- the generating pri nci pie of Einstein 's
symbolically coded message becomes nothing more
than the sequence of the alphabet. He merely proceeds from a to b to c.
Because "original " creation appears as the making
of something out of nothing or the production of
something greater than the sum of its parts - the creation of new value or significance-the caricaturist ,
reintroducing common sense, shows that , in fact, out
of nothing will come nothing and out of something ,
nothing more. Let us consider our second example of
caricature , this one from the realm of artistic creativity.
As in our scientific case , the creative means of expression , the artistic symbolism , comes most directly
under attack. Cham 's humorous representation of
Manet's In cident in the Bull Ring (Figures 2 and 3)
exaggerates to absurdity the technical features for
which the artist was known .9 Manet's painting exhibited
only a limited range of modeling ; he would employ two
or three tones within a given area of local color where
five or six might be demanded by conventional practice. Cham represents Manet's painting as an image of
the crudest silhouettes ; there is no modeling at all ,
no sense of gradation from dark to light, merely black
on white in its barren flatness. To his caricature , Cham
added the following caption: " Having had to complain
of his paint supplier, Manet resolves henceforth to
employ only his inkwell ."
Cham succeeds in impugning both Manet's tech nique and the artistic intention which informed it.
For Emile Zola , Manet's public spokesman , this artist
wished merely to express himself and his own environ ment; simply put, he wished only to paint what he
actually saw in his own individual experience . His task
necessarily became a heroic one , radically creative ,
as soon as he realized that he could not depend upon
inherited artistic convention but must draw forth his
technical means from an intelligent use of materials
directed by his own immediate vision. In other words ,
according to Zola , Manet subordinated his creativity
to his originality. Zola and other sympathetic critics
argued that Manet's "summary" system of modeling
could adequately express the artist and his special
world particularly because this attenuated modeling
ultimately was independent of convention. 10 Zola 's
recognition , however, could come as a challenge to
those less concerned with individuality who would
accept a mode of vision already established . Wary of
fraud , the caricaturist Cham thus proceeds to accuse
Manet of ignoble intention or trivial concern , attributing
his reduced modeling not to the authenticity of his
vision , but, in the end , to a lack of rapport with his
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paint seller. In Cham 's representation , this suspect
modeling becomes not merely diminished , but unrecognizable as any valid variation of standard practice .
We see only flat , cut-out forms gesturing with a resultant lack of expressive refin ement. Manet sought to
create a powerful art with limited means ; Cham represents this limitation as extreme deprivation that can
generate no richness , but only an impoverished
expression. Manet , according to Cham , rejects a valid
technique of painting, replacing it by far inferior means
from which he can bring forth no more than the given
-from something very slight comes nothing grander.
Manet's attempt at creation fails ; it is , in terms of the
artistic achievements of its day, misconceived, misinformed , and misformed -a miscreation .

Part IV
At this point our caricatures call forth a potential
similarity in valid scientific and artistic procedure , for
we see that Cham seems to suggest that the visual
artist, like the scientist, might deserve more personal
credit if his achievement were attributable to a directed
application of technique . Perhaps the artist has no
more cause than the scientist to respond solely to
immediate feeling. Just as Harris could challenge
Einstein 's "genius" by showing his discovery to be the
product of chance , so Cham seems to make Manet's
choice of technique depend upon an extraneous condition- Manet, angered at his paint merchant, has
been led to use only black ink rather than a range of
colored pigments. Thus , Manet's reduction of modeling is portrayed not as the product of reason but of
a situation outside his complete control and unrelated
to the artistic problem at hand. Traditionally, however,
acts of both artistic and scientific genius have been
held to be directed by uncontrolled inspiration or
impulses that may indeed originate outside the world
of reason- Plato , we know, referred to "divine madness. "1 1 But there is nothing of the divine in either
Cham 's presentation of Manet or Harris's depiction of
Einstein . Cham 's caricature displaces Manet's putative
lofty inspiration so that his external motivating force
becomes an otherwise trivial aspect of the material
situation in which he finds himself. Similarly, Harris
humanizes the ethereal Einstein to the point where

Figure 2 Cham . M anet's
Incident in the Bull Ring
( 1864 ), from Charivari,
May 22 , 1864.
Figure 3

Edouard
Manet. The Dead Toreador
(1864). National Gallery of
Art, Washington, D.C.,
Widener Collection.
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the common man may identify with his simple-m in ded
determination ; it takes no divine force to ma ke one 's
way through the order of the alphabet. Nor is Einstein 's
discovery attributable to the great power of his reason .
How then do we evaluate it?
At issue here is a problem that arises in the evaluation of all types of creative invention: from the point of
view of the outside observer or critical interpreter (the
caricaturist in our two specific cases) , the creation
must appear the product of rational procedure if it is
indeed to be judged rationally. The humor in caricatures of creation derives not only from the accusatory
posture that the caricaturing public takes toward the
threatening foreign object, exposing its miscreation,
but also from the implied attempt to find rational foundation where there can be none. Creation , conceived
as original invention , can remain within no conventional system of rational order. As Barthes noted, it is
perceived as genuine magic-in this case the " rabbit"
appears without our assumption of its dependence
on technical procedure.
The issue can be stated somewhat differently: all
"original " creation is likely to be regarded as miscreation , and indeed all such creation is miscreation .
During a period when creativity is generally identified
with originality, " miscreation " becomes an unnecessary term , a redundancy, and we are not surprised to
have observed, at the start, that it is an obsolete word,
only rarely used during our own age . " Miscreation "
does not stand to "creation " as " misbelief" to " belief"
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or " misbehavior" to " behavior. " Systems of belief and
patterns of behavior are established socially and
shared among individuals. False beliefs and improper
behavior are usually easily recognized and held up in
contrast to the norm . In the case of the most radical
creation, there seems to be no norm, for something
new appears that is not merely a variation on the
old. Such creation in any area must appear deviant
from what reason would lead us to expect; and if any
norm is to be applied, the creation will appear to be
miscreation . All "original" creation is deviant. All such
creation is miscreation.
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Part V
Much in our experience must be associated with the
individual, yet evaluated socially. Social judgments
imposed upon individuals do not deny individuality but
frame it, restrict it to the realm of the assimilable. In
attempting to preserve our values , we tend to be more
troubled by deviance than by outright negation. One
who holds a belief that seems a false variant of the
prevailing belief becomes more of an immediate
problem than one who holds no belief or whose values
are so displaced that he seems simply insane. And
those who misbehave are much more disturbing than
those who do not behave at all. 12 A behavioral void
signifies an annihilation, a physical death , or perhaps
a total failure of will. While the prospect of annihilation ,
negative creation , normally seems remote, we must
continually live with flawed creation , miscreation.
Annihilation , even if it should occur, will either appear
as a clearly distinct and very special phenomenon or
will escape our notice, just as the fact that conversations
end in silence seems to have escaped Collingwood 's
full attention (1938 : 250-251 ). In other words , the loss of
an object through annihilation , or the end of artistic
expression in silence, may be mistaken for a mere
misplacement or a misunderstanding. Although death
or complete insanity (negation) may be feared, unlawful
behavior (deviation) is the more immediate presence
in our lives and thus the greater concern and threat
to society.
Miscreation, then , is like misbelief-it threatens not
because it lacks or negates value, but because it
introduces false value,· it does not appear worthless ,
but fraudulent, a representation that misrepresents .
And the fear of fraud which always accompanies the
socialized experience of the work of art makes us all
even as critics or art historians , into caricaturists .
'
When we perform as critics , judging acts of creation ,
we may not exercise the wit of Harris or Cham but
we nevertheless must trivialize , recognizing an'y creation which serves originality, by denying its claim to
reason. We insist on revealing the deception.
I will attempt momentarily to develop my argument
concerning criticism , but I must first reinforce a sense
of creation that may not yet have come fully alive in my
logic . I have argued that the relationship of miscreation
to creation is not that of misbelief to belief; and I have
also stated that miscreation is like misbelief. This argument suggests that creation as well as miscreation may
be linked to misbelief; thus the potential identification
of creation with miscreation can be sustained . Such is
the result, again , of the association of creativity with
originality; for any original making seems to express a
dissatisfaction with the prevailing order of things . The
creative act, if it must be original, becomes the act of
misbelief, the act of the heretic , the expression of false
or deviant values . The modern creator doubts; he

challenges his society's institutions and seeks a deviant
truth. The creative act belongs , then , to the miscreant,
who may appear not only heretical , but villainous , a
danger to his society. The m iscreant artist does not
have full faith in accepted laws and procedures; to a
significant extent he works outside formulation and
convention ; he seems to assume a godlike , or even
satanic , stance. He may, moreover, seem the destructive
wild man ; for he upsets order, causes confusion , and ,
in general , introduces the unpredictable. He seems to
deny our rational sciences .
Now the critical interpreter always assumes a rational
stance ; he must do so in orde r to attain a level of publ ic
discourse giving form , or rather formulation , to the
creation in question . This responsibility to reason
cannot be obviated by the use of ind irect or evocative
critical description ; for such language, if effective
criticism , wil l stil l follow conventional patterns and
suggest relevant comparisons. For example , one of
Manet's distinguished critics , Theophile Thore, had
this to say in response to his viewing the Incident in the
Bull Ring : " M. Manet has the qualities of a mag ician ,
effects of luminosity, flamboyant coloration , which
pastiche Velasquez and Goya, his chosen masters"
( 1893 : Vol . Ill , p. 99 ; my translation). In deal ing with the
radical nature of Manet's painting , Thore invokes the
figure of the mag ician , who like a remarkable artist can
manipulate his technique to produce startling effects.
Through his own creative analogy, Thore manages to
traverse his critical field with a rational dodge-that is,
he makes a move that appeals to our reasonable
expectations . Attributing " magic" to Manet, Thore
seems to explain unconventional effects in a conventional manner; and he reinforces his reasoned
argument by compa ring Manet to two earlier masters,
equally innovative perhaps, but of a past age , and
hence assimilated within the critical canon .
I do not wish to deny that criticism may (or even
must) have an artistic component, nor that it may lead
to further creative discovery - caricature itself is a
revealing art. The critic cannot, however, allow his art
to dominate his rational science, for he would himself
then los~ the distinction between creativity and o riginality, producing his own original art rather than a
clearly defined criticism . Unabashedly artistic criticism
mig.ht itself appear fraudulent; it would not test its object
agamst any rigid standard. To the extent that criticism
serves to maintain or reinforce desirable standards it
must hold a rational line against the release of dis- '
ruptive forces . It must question innovation , rather than
merely accept or extend it, to maintain authority and
guard against the fraudulent. If, to return to our first
example , the truth of Einstein 's E=mc2 is not immediately apparent, Einstein 's critic must demand a
rational explanation .
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We know, however, that radical creation lies beyond
identification by typing , comparison , o r simple deduction from the given ; it should be as free of its origins as
E = mc 2 seemed free of its scientific context before it
was creatively discovered .13 A creation , in other words ,
demonstrates originality when its specific origins
cannot be found , when it seems to have no sources of
its own , but becomes the source for other, lesser
creations. Although E=mc 2 may be deducible from
preexisti ng mathematical laws, it did not seem predicted by them ; it appeared the product of an individual
intuition , not a mechanical mathemical operation available to any investigator. Its generation , appearing as
spontaneous to the popular mind , presented a powerful
challenge to belief.
The critical interpreter is a believer, and one who
wishes to bring the deviant creation back within his
system of belief. If the creation presents difficulties, he
will not hesitate to see it as miscreation , ridiculing it in
the process. In fact, the most radical creations most
readily become miscreations when re-formed by their
critics . The critic must distort creation , making it miscreation , re-forming and rehabilitating it, as if to expose
the miscreance, or at least prevent more damage from
being done to society, that is, the society of both artist
and critic. As a re-former, the critic may save the
miscreant artist from his own acts of creation and seek
to confine the deviant truth within accepted bounds.
Thus , critics often suggest, in advance , the path an
artist's creative activity should take.
A creance is a line used to hold a hawk in training at
bay or in check ; it is a line defining belief and limiting
behavior. Miscreance or misbelief introduces wildness
into a society. When the critic cannot find rational
explanation , when he cannot assimilate creation , he
can either yield his critical stance , accepting , at face
value , the new truth of creation , or he can seek to
expose the act of miscreance . The committed critic 's
aggressively skeptical attitude toward creation reveals
not irreverence , but belief, a healthy attitude toward the
reality of his (our) own world . He would prefer not to
; allow the release of untrustworthy hawks and must
1 choose to caricature , to exhibit any original creation
; as miscreation .14

Part VI
Have I gone too far in making critics and creative artists
(and creative scientists) adversaries? Can there be no
critical cooperation , perhaps a completion of the work
of art by means of a body of critical commentary? The
creation or work of art considered as an external
object seems capable of bearing endless (but not any)
interpretation ; it is an undeniable fact in the world , a
truth to be perceived . But the association of creativity
with originality leads to questions of artistic genesis
rather than of final artistic form. Where does the work
come from? How does it develop? When the meaning
or truth of creation is verified not in objectively defined
(yet not necessarily permanent) properties of the work ,
but demonstrated rather in its genesis , the problematic
nature of the critique of creation emerges. Often we
speak of creation intensified by the term " radical " to
designate its genetic originality- radical creation has
no simpler antecedent form ; it is a root from which
other forms grow. Its own parentage and kinship relations are not known with certainty ; it may thus evade our
categories and comparisons.
Our two caricaturists have demonstrated indirectly
that radical , "original " human creation can be the
product neither of simple reason nor of mere chance.
Like Collingwood, they do not wish to confine genuine
creativity to questions of craft, nor do they wish to
eliminate the sense of a directing human will . Harris
and Cham both chose to reduce creation to the
comical by making the creative act appear outside
human control , with the success or failure of the
creation only ironically related to the conditions of its
generation . They might both have succeeded equally
well , however, had they chosen to expose some truly
rational procedure to account for the productions of
Einstein and Manet. This, too , would serve to discredit
any claim to radical creativity. In this alternative situation , Harris and Cham would not as readily appear
as caricaturists , but rather as hard-headed detectives
uncovering acts of fraud or charlatanism . They would
show that the cr.eations under investigation were something less than we (or their creators) might presume.
The creation would appear as if prefigured in its assumed
preconditions. In this viewing , any obscurity in its
apparent generative procedure could be attributed to
either one of two failings-to an inelegant presentation ,
that is, an act of technical ineptitide, or to an intentional
deception , some pretense of sincerity. The latter failure ,
one of character rather than of skill , would amount
to a conscious act of making the easy look difficult, so
that originality might seem to arise from some radical
technical discontinuity. I will come to argue that the
art historian (as opposed to the art critic) characteristically demands, and finds, a rationally structured
context, however well hidden, out of which the creation
under investigation may logically arise. But first we
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must consider the critic 's evaluative task of distinguishing what is technically easy, or only deceptively difficult,
from what is genu inely difficu lt or "original. "
Albert A urier, the early champion of Van Gogh 's
artistic original ity and sincerity, admitted that this
evaluative project cou ld not be completed by applying
any objective critical standards (1893: 260). The critic
who encounters Manet, Van Gogh , or any other creator
whose tec hniq ue seems deviant, lacks the means to
judge w heth er the departure from con vention (or from
evidently ratio nal proced ure) is an indication of a mere
avoidance of difficulty or a consequence of its necessary
acceptance . For, if tech nical deviation were associated
unquestio ni ngly with rad ical creativity, then fraud
might become rampant; any "artist" might readily
master the technique of originality by exhibiting a
faulty craft wh ich the critic would take to be a sign of
creative authority, genui ne creative deviance. The
miscreation would seem the most genuine creation.
In approaching this unsatisfactory so lution , we seem
to have slipped into speaking of creation as located in a
fixed created thing , an end product of craft, subject to
(or resisting) analysis . But we had already suggested
that the genuineness of "orig inal" creation would be best
determined by an investigation of the act itself, not its
resu lting object. Harris and Cham seem to have speculated as to what acts or situations could have generated
E=mc 2 and the Incident in the Bull Ring ; their interest
lay in the creative process. The related desire to make
the most empirically founded judgments of creative acts
has led others to photograph Picasso and Matisse
working out successive stages of their paintings and to
record before the camera a performance of Jackson
Pollock , pouring one of his "drip" paintings upon a
sheet of glass seen from below. Nevertheless, firm
evidence of any principle linking specific technical
patterns to authentic creativity has remained elusive .
The committed skepticism of Harris and Cham seems
justified.
Charles Baudelaire, who spoke in defense of Manet's
creative powers , sought to solve the problem of the
critic by allowing him neither the easy shortcuts of
complete acceptance or complete rejection of creation ,
nor the diversion of his own self-indulgent creative
activity. There remained a firm distinction between
critical and artistic conduct for Baudelaire, and (as a
critic) he maintained his distance from works of art.
Yet he recognized a dual nature in artistic creation
itself. Of Delacroix he wrote:

It is clear that, in his eyes, imagination was the most
precious gift, the most important faculty, but that this faculty
remained powerless and sterile if it did not have at its
command a swift technical skill (une habilite rapid e) ,
capable of following the great despotic faculty in its
impatient flights of fancy. There was certainly no need for
him to stoke up the fires of his imagination , constantly at
white heat; but he always found the day too short for
the study of the techn ical means of expression (les
moyens d 'expression) . [1972 :363]

Baudelaire never regarded the study of technical
means and conventional devices as unworthy of the
attention of the artistic imagination , the source of
creation. If something new was to come into our world ,
it could do so only with the active cooperation of an
artistic medium or language subject to reasoned
analysis. According to Baudelaire's standard , the
works of Einstein and Manet, if technically malformed
as Harris and Cham depicted them , would indeed be
suspect. For Baudelaire , "a great painter [or any
creator] is of necessity a good painter [i .e., techn ically
skilled ], because a universal imagination comprises
the understanding of all technical means and the
desire to acquire them " (1972 :306) . The artist must be
master of both his immediate passions and his mediating science or technique .15
Baudelaire as critic sought a means of preserving
the sense of mastery in the work of art. His was at
times a passive criticism , yet a productive one. As
critic , Baudelaire often seemed himself to assume the
"animal-like stare " of curiosity, wonder, absorption ,
and even ecstasy that he associated with the childlike
element in the modern artist (1972:398). And
Baudelaire willingly gave up the critic 's greatest
defense against disruption- not his reason, for he
kept that, but his belief. Baudelaire associated belief
and principle with systems, schools, and academies.
The Universal Exhibition of 1855 , which included
products of many foreign cultures , seemed to provide
him with a field of experience that no system of belief
could encompass ; his world was at once radically
expanded and multiplied . He recognized the opportunity
for his own education and growth before an abundance
of products of the imagination serving to call his
attention to the power of any single such product. In
the foreign , the incompatible, he discovered a vital
beauty: "Anything that is not slightly misshapen has an
air of insensibility ... irregularity is the characteristic of
beauty...lebeau est toujours bizarre " (197 5:161-162 ;
1962 :215) . In associating the beautiful with the bizarre,
even the "ugly," Baudelaire realized , in effect, the identity
of creation and miscreation and the need to suppress
his own belief, his own prejudgment. He wrote in the
theoretical preface to his review of the Universal
Exhibition :
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Like all my friend s I have tried more th an o nce to loc k
myself inside a system , so as to be able to pontificate as
I liked . But a system is a kind of damnation that condemns
us to perpetual backsliding ; we are always having to invent
another, and this form of fatigue is a cruel punishment. ..
And every time, soma spontaneous unexpected product
of universal vitality would come and give the lie to my
puerile and old-fashioned wisdom ... Under the threat of
being constantly humiliated by another conversion , I took
a big deci sion ... I became content to feel ; I came back and
bought sanctuary in impeccable naivete. I humbly beg
pardon of academics of every kind ... at least I can now
declare, in so far as a man can answer for his virtues, that
my mind now enjoys a more abundant impartiality.
[ 1972 :117-118]

Without abandoning his powers of reason (he has
much lucid commentary to apply to lngres and
Delacroix) , Baudelaire allows himself to deviate in his
belief, to submit himself to the products of artistic
miscreance . This is to say that Baudelaire comes to
hold a different kind of belief, perhaps a misbelief, one
more compatible with the full concept of creation ,
whether linked to originality or not. He comes to
believe in or value change and growth in the individual .
He expects to benefit from a changing rather than a
stable world, and he locates the source of creative
change in human imagination . Still , his concern is for
the growth of the world of his society as well as of the
individual ; and such social or collaborative change is
best conceived as continuous rather than radically
disjunctive. In the absence of any ultimate all-powerful
artistic experience that would obviate the function of
rational critical discourse and lead to silence, Baudelaire
depends upon the reasoned mediation of artistic technique and critical language to establish a community
of shared creative experience. When he speaks , for
example, of the painter's use of color, he refers both
to clear rational principles- "the bigger the picture , the
broader must be the touches of color" -and to artistic
achievement founded upon such principles, yet extending beyond his own reason 's firm grasp-the co!orist's
" most delicate operations are the result of a sent1ment
which long practice has brought to a degree of
sureness that defeats description ." At the point of such
technical facility, imagination is liberated . The creative
process develops through a rational application of
· technique to a point where it may seem to tr~nscend .
· that background- this is artistic mastery. Art1st1c med1a
; are " no more than the most humble handmaids of a
unique and superior faculty. If a very neat execution is
1 necessary, that is so that the language of dreams may
I be very clearly translated " (1972:304-305) .
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Believing in both reason and the dream, but not in
fixed beliefs, and identifying artistic creation with
apparent deviance, Baudelaire could , as an individual
case demanded , defend an artist he admired by
demonstrating either his capacity for rational science
or for imaginative art. He could seek to negate the
effects of caricature by claiming that his artist was
indeed rational-or indeed imaginative. In the case of
Manet he found it necessary to do both .
Baudelaire defended the very creation we have seen
Cham ridicule , the Incident in the Bull Ring. This painting , aside from being attacked for exhibiting a misapplication of technique, came to be seen as revealing
a lack of originality. This amounted to a most serious
charge against the artist, since genuine artistic imagination , in Baudelaire's own words , "creates a new world "
(1972 :299). If Manet's art could be shown to reveal
nothing original , to reduce to a pastiche of "sources"familiar images and stylistic devices merely recombined so that the new work amounted to no more than
the sum of its well-known parts-then Manet would
appear a fraudulent artist, misrepresenting old forms
as a new creation . Cham 's caricature of Manet was
reinforced by some remarks made by Theophile Thore,
to which we have already referred . Unlike Cham ,
Thore found something favorable to say of Manet,
noting that, although his style was unconventional , and
perhaps extremely so , it was forceful . Thore nevertheless raised the problem of artistic originality by speak1ng
of "sources," asserting that the dead toreador in the
Incident of the Bull Ring had been copied after a figure
by Velasquez and that the general style of the painting
was dependent upon both Velasquez and Goya
(1893:Vol . Ill , pp. 98-100). 16 (The "source" of the
figure of the dead toreador given by Thore, a painting
at that time in the Pourtales Collection , is no longer
attributed to Velasquez.) Although Thore might expect
to find a complex of resemblances , even in works of
the most original artists, Baudelaire took the challenge
of his remarks very seriously.17
Having previously made Thore's acquaintance,
Baudelaire sent a friendly reply to his critique of Manet.
He insisted that Manet was both rational and creatively
original. With respect to the first point, Baudelaire
wrote: " M. Manet, who is regarded wild and insane, is
simply an ordinary straightforward man , doing everything he can to be reasonable (raisonnable) , but
unfortunately touched with romanticism since birth. "
For Baudelaire " romanticism " was associated with
individuality and passionate feeling ; yet Manet, like
Delacroix, exhibited as much reason and science as
could be applied to this imaginative force . Baudelaire
thus implied that Manet's technique was appropriate to
his artistic enterprise. Moreover, Manet was an original ,
for whose work the term "pastiche" could not be
employed - Baudelaire stated flatly that Manet had not
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been influenced by the Span ish masters ; there were
no "sources" for his creation; any resemblance was a
"mysterious coincidence" (1948 : Vol. IV, pp. 275-277). 18
Arguing in thi s man ner, Baudelaire sought to restore
to Manet's painting the two qualities w hich caricaturists
would have removed: a sense of the rational, meaningfu l application of tech nique and a se nse of originality,
the creation of som eth ing gen uinely new. Art historians,
as opposed to critics , tend to conce ntrate on the
seco nd factor, origin ality. Th ore hi mself was a pioneer
of art history, ad ept at relating works of art to historical
contexts , both social environm ents and pictorial traditions. In speaking of Manet, he was facing the task of
evaluating a co ntem po rary, not an established historical
figure . Baudelaire tha nked Thore for rendering Manet
at least some justice in regard ing his work as a serious
contribution. Baudelaire knew well that the denial of
originality was a more ad vanced stage in the process
of critical acceptance than either a lack of critical
commentary or critical ridicule .
Historians especially are likely to be silent before
radical creation. This is silence as Collingwood might
interpret it, the silence of incomprehension . Faced
with the task of "explaining " or providing a historical
context for a work that resembles little of the familiar,
they may act as if the work did not exist; resisting interpretation , the work seems unworthy of any interpretation at all and remains unassimilated. To point out its
flaws , to describe it as fraudulent creation , is to accept
its presence, however grudgingly. At this stage caricature is most apparent and the work may be compared
unfavorably with accepted members of the tradition ;
clearly it is miscreation . Usually, however, art historians
begin to discover sources for the work , a context
eventually so well defined that the character of the new
work seems inevitably determined . Assuming Manet's
experience of Goya and Velasquez, for example, one
argues that he is led to produce the Incident in the Bull
Ring by way of a reasoned use of an imitative technique.
Simply conceived , such completion or perfection of
explication seems the ideal of art history, especially of
an art history regarded as a rational "science. " Unfortunately, once the art historian 's work is completed ,
the artistic creation seems - perhaps not miscreation but rather no "original " creation at all ; it is merely the
sum of its parts, lacking any mystery, devoid of any
personalized element that can resist public understanding. Now a dead issue for the critic , it becomes
dead art. An insistence upon originality may lead to a
standard that cannot be met; the able historian will
eventually construct an amalgam of antecedents to
substitute for any work he considers worthy of his study.

My position on the historian 's role risks oversimplification , yet I think this view fundamentally accurate in
its focus . The historian , like the critic , can perform his
task too well , can believe too strongly in the rational
order of things ; he can overdetermine the creative
work so that it appears a product solely of reason and
familiar technique rather than of a higher Baudelairean
imagination . Nevertheless, as Baudelaire knew, in the
face of creation one still does not abandon reason . Art
history can become caricature when it retains too
much of the mystery of creation just as when it seeks
to eliminate all such mystery. The art historian 's appeal
to the unarticulated evidence of the visual can produce
an explication, couched in rational language, having
no firm foundation in reason. In the alternative to the
search for clearly identified sources and other elements
of a structured historical context, the art historian can
appeal too strongly to a non rational sense of individual
artistic identity and the "look" of the objective evidence
he presents .
My choice of illustration for th is point- Herbert
Cook 's brief and generally forgotten " Note on Spanzotti ,
the Master of Sodoma" (1918 :208) - will seem so
extreme that it might be considered a caricature of art
history itself, an example of m iscreated criticism. The
resemblance to other more successful art historical
presentations should , however, be evident, as well as
should the unsatisfactorily indeterminate nature of any
appeal by a critic-historian to his reader's own critical
vision . Spanzotti , an Italian Renaissance painter, was ,
as Cook admits, " hardly of the first, or even second ,
rank as an artist. " Cook 's purpose is to attribute to the
oeuvre of Spanzotti , reconstituted only in the publ ication on this artist by Conte Alessandro Baudi di Vesme ,
one more painting , a Madonna and Child Enthroned,
previously attributed to the school of Foppa. Cook
notes that the Madonna bears a monogram found also
on a painting given by Conte di Vesme to Spanzotti 's
hand. To this circumstantial evidence , Cook adds what
he takes to be more conclusive :
The general style of the Madonna tallies with other works
of the kind [attributed to Spanzotti] (all published in [Conte
di Vesme's] book) , to which the reader must be referred .
Suffice it to say that Conte di Vesme concurs in the addition of this picture to the list of Span zotti 's works, although
he only knows of it from a photograph .

Cook has given his argument a form that allows him
to evade any rational analysis of the work itself; he
meets creation with his own creative insight and he
reaches a decision without establishing any clear
grounds for doing so. The reader is referred to photographs of Spanzotti 's works (and secondarily to Conte
di Vesme's authority) , but never to analytical descriptions of the photog raphs; and he must thus reach his
own creative intuition regarding the question of attri-
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bution - he will either "see" to agreeing with Coo k or
he will not. Ironically, Cook's " Note on Spanzotti" was
followed by this bracketed comme nt from his editor:
Owing to the difficulty of procuring photographs, we are
precluded from the possibility of supplying illustrations of
the pictures which , as Mr. Cook points out, strengthen an
attribution which prima facie seems not ful ly convincing .

The ed ito r here refers to those illustrations which
would , according to Cook , establish "links" between
the admitted "extremes of style" exhibited by his two
primary objects of study, the two paintings bearing the
same monogram , but presumably differing in date of
execution . In sum , Cook 's "argument" depended upon
the simple presentation of a certain number of
Spanzotti's works (as photographs), but the works
could not be present - consequently Cook was left
with no argument and his reader, or viewer, could
experience no conviction . Had Cook 's editor attained
only slightly more ironic distance from his own journal ,
he might have asked whether the mere presence of
photographs could ever have settled a question
formulated around concepts of historical context and
stylistic attribution. If the works reveal "extremes of
style ," what concept of style is sufficient to bridge the
logical gap between them? How many mediating
images must exist to give us a sense of orderly technical evolution?
Cook 's mode of art history and criticism might be
very creative in its association of images linked by
stylistic qualities that remain ineffable. If, however, art
history is to be considered not a "creative" art, but an
academic study, rational like a "science ," Cook , as
scientist, would seem to open himself to the same
caricaturing criticism that Einstein suffered . If indeed no
stylistic link among Spanzotti 's works can be articulated ,
then perhaps Cook has operated under no meaningful
principle and has discovered the contents of his artist's
oeuvre merely by chance , as Einstein , according to
Harris's humorous account, may have fallen into discovering E=mc 2 . We have seen t~at , on the one hand ,
the art historical study of sources may attenuate or even
defeat the power of creation by moving toward a final
denial of originality. But, on the other hand , the appeal
to a sympathetic critical "vision " may render creation
meaningless , subject to the endless vagaries of individual sensibility. The refusal to use any clearly articu lated standard of appraisal serves the ends of criticism
no more than does the reduction of a work to a conventional pattern.
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Now if indeed we were all to be equally convinced of
some truth by the mere presentation of a visual image
for our inspection , without our being able to speak
rationally of the cause of our agreement, might we not
feel that our critical enterprise of interpretation had
succeeded? Would this be a silence of complete understanding? I must argue that such a result is not one of
an ideal criticism , but of some ideal art. The critic must
assume that such universal agreement will not be
reached ; there must always be further investigation and
debate with regard to the work of art. The critic must
not remain passive indefinitely before the work ; he must
retain his will , a kind of belief. He expresses his will ,
his resistance , even his stubborn misunderstanding , by
means of his reason. He assumes, as Baudelaire did ,
that both the artist's return to the creative , imaginative
vision of childhood and the critic's own assumption of
a childlike na·(vete are to some extent voluntary He
assumes that although art strives for perfection , this
state is never attained ; beauty must be transient. If the
unexpected act of fully "original " creation should occur,
the critic would seem to face a divine rather than human
creator, one not to be questioned. In this case , any
critical commentary would surely be an act of irreverent
miscreance . In order to be both critic and believer, the
critic must assume that artists only pretend to divinity;
their miscreations must be unmasked. In this manner,
the ideal of individual and social growth can be maintained amidst the continuing encounter with creations ,
none of which will effect complete or final change ; each
will be seen as flawed or misformed to an extent sufficient to call forth further creation. Creation becomes
possible only in a world of miscreation , a world not
completely formed.

Part VII
In my own play upon words , as I linked miscreation to
the miscreant, there was perhaps an element of caricature involved ; for the " reason " in my argument might
have seemed to derive from the chance alphabetical
placement of " miscreation " following upon " miscreant."
Perhaps it appeared that I had no more reason to associate the concepts of misbelief and misgrowth (or misshaping) than did Harris's Einstein to move from
E=ma 2 to E=mb 2 to a final miscreated solution . I
played briefly with etymology, too , speculating upon the
possibility of a core of meaning subsuming both belief
or principle and creation or growth , a concept such
as education or development. If at the end of all this
speculation any belief can be reached , it must be in the
relevance of the notion of education or human growth
to both artistic and critical enterprises.

70

studies in Visual Communication

Creation is a change from which we learn. In its most
radical form it would force an entirely new system of
belief, a new set of principles, upon us; growth would
follow from a new root. It seems, however, that the
"radical" creation we normally encounter is only of a
relatively radical nature - the creations, for example, of
Manet and Einstein, allowing room for doubt, remain
subject to caricaturing criticism . We learn from such
criticism so long as it does not continue to demand
insistently what creation cannot provide, a final rational
explanation for its own presence. "In the realm of poetry
and art," Baudelaire wrote, "the great discoverers rarely
have precursors. Every flowering is spontaneous, individual." And , just as the artist must to some extent be
cut off from models or sources, so the scholar or critic
must embody the creative imagination in his work:
"What does opinion say of a scholar without imagination? That he has learned all that can be learned, because
it has been taught, but he will never discover laws as
yet unsuspected of existing " (1972:122, 300). The
critic must be receptive to a new truth.
Yet not passively receptive. Whoever performs the
critical act must assume that the truth of a work of art
is not self-evident; the artist may have intended to falsify
or he may simply have been deluded. The problematic
area to be investigated is not originality, but creativity
in the narrower sense. One must consider the artist's
means of expression, for technique conveys the artistic
communication that we must presume to have failed; it
fails to attain immediate universality, to convince, or to
silence. As he remains unconvinced , the critic is free to
disassociate creativity from originality, to expose any
pretense to full artistic originality. As he applies reason
to resistant creation, the critic seeks neither the identification of a complete set of "sources" nor the reception
of a final message. Instead he concentrates on the
language of creation, the structured source of communication and community. He remains silent on proper
usage and points of agreement, but must speak out on
seeing any irregularity or discontinuity. To take such an
evaluative stance, to become active in response to the
work and to defend oneself against it, is already to have
considered the communication flawed and to have
posited a greater art to come. The present creation
begins to appear subject to caricature and we, in turn,
seem able to transcend that which seemed itself to
escape the world of our own past. With some irony, the
critic must see all who claim the special status of artist
as miscreants and all their creation as miscreation;
but such vision makes continuing education and
growth- indeed life itself - possible.
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When Collingwood speaks of deliberate and responsible making that
is yet not predetermined (1938:236-238), he has in mind a
distinction between automatism and self-consciousness in the use
of an expressive medium.
See also Collingwood (1938:43) where the author distinguishes,
as a falsification of artistic originality, any uniqueness or novelty planned
and achieved for its own sake.
Cf. Polanyi and Prosch (1978:98): "the meaning of a poem comes
into existence only with its words. " (Original emphasis.)
Cf. Collingwood (1938:273): "The activity which generates an arti£tic
experience is the activity of consciousness ... [art's] origin lies .. .in
[man 's] nature as a thinking being ."
I have explored the relationship of art to life in an essay entitled
"Art and Life: A Metaphorical Relationship" (1978a).
But it need not involve extreme individuality; original artistic expression may be , indeed normally is, collaborative . See Collingwood
(1938:315-324).
Cf. Collingwood (1938 : 130, 291). In postmedieval Christian theology,
divine creation is usually conceived as ex nihilo (as it is in
Collingwood 's theory of art). Nevertheless, the Biblical account of
creation need not be regarded primarily as an account of origins
but rather as a statement of the relation of man to God (man 's
creator); and the notion of a "continuing " or immanent creation also
competes with that of creation as a first cause or historical origin.
To speak of an original act of divine creation in terms of a working
of preexisting matter (as in pagan myth) seems a metaphorical
inversion - that is, the act of God is, to some extent, de mystified
or dedifferentiated by being described in terms of a familiar human
procedure. (On this point, cf. Frye [1980:4]: for some the " notion
of a creating God is a projection from the fact that man makes things ,
and for them a divine creator has only the reality of a shadow thrown
by ourselves .") If creation , as a kind of crafting or fabricating, is to
be distinguished in its mundane and divine modes, divine creation is,
indeed , best associated with the notion of creation ex nihilo.
Original emphasis. The translator renders Barthes' " Einstein dessine"
as "cartoons of Einstein ." Barthes is contrasting the photograph
to what he regards as a more interpretive and distorted class of
images, all artistic drawings or renderings , whether self-consciously
caricatural or not.

Miscreation

9 Cham was the pseudonym of Amedee de Noe ( 1819 - 1879). The
translation of the caption to his caricature (following in the text) is my
own. The Incident in the Bull Ring , that Cham represents schematically, no longer exists in its entirety. Manet, himself, dismembered
it, and two fragments are known today: the Dead Toreador in the
National Gallery, Washington ( Figure 3) , and the Bullfight in the Frick
Collection , New York (illustrated as Plate 8a in Hamilton 1954 ). For
general discussions of the critical response to the painting and its
history, see Hamilton (1954 :51-64) and Hanson ( 1977 :82 -85) On
the problem of Manet's cut canvases , see Hanson (1970: 158-166).
10 In 1867 Zola remarked (1970: 108) that the fragment of the Incident in
the Bull Ring , the Dead Toreador, was nevertheless relatively "detailed "
and "tightly" modeled ; the public would prefer it to some of Manet's
other works . Apparently, however, the public (Cham) had previously
found Manet's entire painting incoherent. The perspective was
considered faulty, as well as the modeling , and Cham 's drawing
seems to ridicule both these technical features - but his caption calls
our attention to the modeling especially.
11 Erwin Panofsky argues (1962 : 121 -182 , esp . 172-173) that the
modern association of either artistic or scientific genius with inspiration , "divine madness," and related notions originates in the
Renaissance .
12 There may, indeed , be situations in which negation becomes more
threatening than deviance, but creative activity (as here conceived )
is not among them. The problematic nature of the individual who
lacks belief, will , patterns of behavior, or " preference" is presented by
Herman Melville in his " Bartleby the Scrivener." In this short story,
the characters Turkey and Nippers may be described as deviant,
and therefore troublesome , but finally assimilated comfortably within
their society Bartleby, on the other hand , seems the negation of all
that society serves to establish - he does not express improper
desires, but no desires at all - and it is Bartleby, not Turkey or Nippers,
who must be institutionalized in the end. Franz Kafka, too, raises
the problem of negation in , to choose one example , his parable
"An Old Manuscript. " In this brief tale, Kafka describes villagers who
mistake as deviance, or the desire for the unacceptable, the negativeness of their nomadic intruders-the nomads' inexpressiveness,
the absolute unpredictability of their behavior. See Shiff (1978b)
tor a discussion of the Kafka parable.
13 On this issue, ct. Polanyi (1958: 117-131)
14 1have argued (1978b) that the critic (or audience) must impose
rational standards upon art even while he maintains that true art must
always evade such judgments. .
.
. .
.
15 Similarly, Collingwood locates art man 1magmat1on conce1ved as
mediating between unarticulated desires and rational intellectual
constructs (1938 :195 , 213 , 221-224 , 281-282).
116 Michael Fried , who argues from within a more specific historical
context than that of the present essay (1969 :28-82 , esp. 67 -68) ,
provides the deepest understanding of the comments that Thore
brought to bear upon Manet's art, ~elating them to not1ons of nat1on~l
character and realism which.Thore had previously developed . Fned s
essay is an unusually rich account of the significance of an artist's .
use of specific sources and transcends many art h1stoncal d1ff1cult1es
to which 1wish to call attention in my account of the exchange
between Thore and Baudelaire. Ct. Fried 's distinction between "sanction " and "influence" (1969:fn. 47, p. 70)
,17 On Thore's habit of noting resemblances , see , for example , the
passage on Diaz's originality, written in 1846 (1893:Vol. I, pp. 290-2 91)
18 Letter to Theophile Thore , c. 20 June 1864 , repnnted 1n Baudelaire
(1948:Vol. IV, pp. 275-277 ; my translation) . Baudelaire, in 1846, had
defe~ded Delacroix in very similar fashion , argu1ng that th1s pa1nter
was a master of rational technique , in whose works chance played
no part whatsoever, and that he was one of those " who retam the1r ,
originality even after having borrowed from all the genu1ne sources
(1972:65). Thore replied to Baudelaire 's objections 1n what has ,
become a familiar art historical manner: conced1ng to Baudela~re s
claim that Manet had not seen the Velasquez in quest1on , Thore
simply argued that the artist must have encountered some 1nter- .
mediary image, perhaps a photograph of the work or some graphic
study or reproduction (1893: Vol. Ill , pp. 137-138).

71

References
• Aurier, Albert
1893
Les !soles: Vincent Van Gogh. In Oeuvres Posthumes.
Paris Mercure de France.
• Barthes, Roland
1972
The Brain of Einstein.ln Mythologies. Annette Lavers , trans.
New York : Hill and Wang .
• Baudelaire, Charles
1948
Oeuvres complete , Correspondance generale. 18 vols.
Jacques Crepet, ed. Paris: L. Conard.
1962
Exposition universelle de 1855. In Curiosites esthetiques,
L'Art romantique , et autres oevres critiques Henri Lemaitre ,
ed . Paris: Editions Garnier Freres.
1972
The Life and Work of Eugene Delacroix; The Painter of
Modern Life ; The Salon of 1859 ; The Universal Exhibition
of 1855.1n Selected Writings on Art and Artists. P. E. Charvet,
trans. Harmondsworth : Penguin Books.
1975
Rockets (Fusees) In My Heart Laid Bare and Other Prose
Writings. Peter Quennel! , ed. Norman Cameron , trans .
New York: Haskell Booksellers.
• Collingwood , R.G.
19 38
The Prin ci ples of Art. New York : Oxford .
• Cook , Herbert
1918
Note on Spanzotti , the Master of Sodoma . Burl ington
Magazine XXXIII ( 189) 208
• Derrida, Jacques
1977
Signature Event Context. Glyph 1:172-197 .
• Fried , Michael
1969
Manet's Sources: Aspects of His Art, 1859-1865 . Artforum
Vll (6): 28-82
• Frye, Northrop
1980
Creation and Recreation. Toronto : University of Toronto
Press.
• Hamilton , George Heard
1954
Manet and His Critics. New Haven : Yale University Press.
• Hanson , Anne Coffin
1970
Edouard Manet, "Les Gitanos" and the Cut Canvas. Burlington Magazine CXII :158-166 .
1977
Manet and the Modern Tradition. New Haven : Yale University Press.
• Panofsky, Erwin
.
1962
Artist , Scientist, Genius: Notes on the " RenalssanceDammerung ." In The Renaissance Six Essays. New York
The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
• Polanyi , Michael
1958
Personal Knowledge. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
• _ _ , and Prosch , Harry
1978
Meaning. Chicago University of Chicago Press.
• Shiff, Richard
.
1978a
Art and Life : A Metaphorical Relationship Critical lnqu1ry
5:107-122
1978b The Art of Excellence and the Art of the Unattainable.
Georgia Review XXXII( 4 ):829-841 .
• Thore , Theophile (Thore-Burger)
.
1893
Salon de 1864 . 1n Les Salons. 3 vols. Brussels: H. Lamertm .
• Wertheimer, Max
1959
Productive Thinking. Michael Wertheimer, ed. New York:
Harper
• Zola , Emile
.
1970
Edouard Manet. In Mon Salon , Manet, Ecrits sur L'Art.
Antoinette Ehrard , ed . Paris: Garnier-Fiammarion.

